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Three decades of policy layering and politically sustainable 
reform in the European Union's agricultural policy 
 
CARSTEN DAUGBJERG and ALAN SWINBANK 
 
Abstract:  
The study of policy reform has tended to focus on single stage reforms taking place over a relatively 
short period. Recent research has drawn attention to gradual policy changes unfolding over 
extended periods. One strategy of gradual change is layering in which new policy dimensions are 
introduced by adding new policy instruments or by redesigning existing ones to address new 
concerns. The limited research on single stage policy reforms highlights that these may not endure 
in the post-enactment phase when circumstances change. We argue that gradual policy layering may 
create sustainability dynamics that can result in lasting reform trajectories. The European Union’s 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) has changed substantially over the last three decades in 
response to emerging policy concerns by adding new layers. This succession of reforms proved 
durable and resilient to reversal in the lead-up to the 2013 CAP reform when institutional and 
political circumstances changed. 
 
 
Introduction 
The European Union’s (EU) Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) as initially designed in the 1960s 
and 70s was very resilient to change. This ‘old’ CAP, which focussed on market price support, had 
reached its zenith by the early 1980s. It resulted in mounting public stocks of products bought into 
intervention, soaring budget costs, disputes with the EU’s trade partners, and squabbles between the 
Member States. An earlier attempt to change the policy course —the Mansholt Plan of 1968— had 
been rebuffed. In 1984, however, with the introduction of milk quotas, the balance of forces began 
to shift. Then, with the adoption of the MacSharry reform in 1992, the CAP embarked on a course 
of continued policy change. Whilst individual policy-makers may have had a longer-term reform 
strategy in mind, each ‘reform’ was adopted as a discrete change matched to the circumstances of 
the time, driven and enabled by developments in first the GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and 
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Trade) and then in the WTO (World Trade Organization) farm trade negotiations (Daugbjerg & 
Swinbank 2009). 
 
This paper identifies seven significant policy changes (in 1984, 1988, 1992, 1999, 2003, 2008 and 
2013)1 all of which are referred to as reforms in that they altered policy instruments or substantially 
redesigned existing ones. The politics of the CAP over the last three decades has been one of 
continuous reform: with the exception of René Steichen, a member of Jacques Delors’ third College 
of Commissioners in 1993-94, all of the Commissioners for Agriculture since 1981 have presided 
over a policy reform.2  
 
The series of GATT/WTO induced reforms has had significant impact. Although farmers in Europe 
still receive comparatively high levels of support, they are now subsidised in much less trade 
distorting ways. From being predominately a high-price policy in which consumers paid a 
significant share of the costs of supporting farmers through artificially high consumer prices, the 
CAP now relies heavily on decoupled direct payments: decoupled in that these taxpayer funded 
payments are not linked to price movements or the volume of production, although in the first 
instance in 1992 they were tied to the area planted to arable crops and the number of grazing 
livestock kept. Price support created strong incentives for farmers to increase production, often 
creating surpluses which were dumped on world markets. Furthermore, high import taxes restricted 
trade. Decoupled payments have a minimal impact because they provide little incentive to increase 
or even maintain production. Another important development is that since the late 1990s direct 
payments have been increasingly linked to compliance with environmental and other public interest 
regulations, and these greening measures are now said to legitimise farm support.  
 
This gradual dual reform trajectory was stable over three decades even though political and 
institutional circumstances had changed by 2013. For example, stalemate in the WTO’s Doha 
Round of trade negotiations following the failure to secure a breakthrough in 2008, meant that 
                                                          
1
The 2003 Fischler reform might be thought of as a multiple or extended reform process, extending over several years, 
some under the direction of Franz Fischler’s successor Mariann Fisher-Boel. We acknowledge that there have been 
other, incremental, changes in policy design —the introduction of the co-responsibility levy on milk in 1977, the Small 
Farmers Scheme in 2001, or the milk package of 2012, for example 
 
2
 The European Commission (originally known as the Commission of the European Communities), currently headed 
by 28 Commissioners, is the EU’s administrative organ. It interacts with the Council of Ministers, on which sit 
representatives of the Member States, and with the directly elected European Parliament. 
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external constraints were no longer of pressing concern. The Lisbon Treaty’s extension of the co-
decision making powers of the European Parliament (EP) to cover the CAP brought the EP’s 
conservative Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development (COMAGRI) into the reform 
process (Knops and Swinnen, 2014). These developments, arguably, empowered those interests 
who wanted the CAP to return to a more traditional mode.  
 
In 2007 President Sarkozy of France had told a farming audience that ‘everyone knows’ that the 
‘CAP as it stands today cannot meet the challenges of post-2013’. He did not ‘like the notion of 
decoupling’. Farmers ‘should be able to make a living from the prices they are paid  ...  by means of 
a real EU market stabilization policy’. Indeed Alons and Zwaan (2015: 14) have noted that ‘a 
central argument that surfaced in the French governmental discourse on the CAP post-2013 reform 
was that agriculture cannot be left to the market and market regulation is indispensible.’ Despite a 
severe financial crisis, and austerity in national budgets, which might have suggested a sharply 
reduced budget for the CAP, in October 2012 several Member States, and elements within the EP, 
called for a ‘strong’ CAP and the maintenance of its budget: see for example the comments of the 
French, Italian and Spanish farm ministers – all important players in CAP politics (Ministère de 
l’Agriculture, 2012).  
 
In spite of these significantly changed circumstances, the CAP by and large remained intact in its 
2013 reconfiguration, albeit with some, but limited, backtracking to more coupled farm payments. 
Although the trajectory of increased greening, adding environmental conditionality to direct 
payments, was —some would argue— maintained, the environmental enhancement impact of these 
measures is increasingly questioned, but there was definitely no backtracking on this dimension. 
When contrasted with the US experience with agricultural policy reforms in the 1990s, the EU’s 
achievement is remarkable. The Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform (FAIR) Act of 1996 
was a single-stage reform which phased out a substantial share of agricultural support; but a mere 
two years later ‘emergency’ payments were introduced to compensate farmers for a decline in 
commodity prices. Patashnik (2003: 219) claims that the 2002 Farm Bill, which then followed, 
ended ‘the pretence that policy-makers were serious about weaning farmers from government 
subsidies.’ 
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The twin trajectory of redesigning EU farm price support into WTO-compatible decoupled 
payments, together with the greening of the CAP, can be characterised as a stepwise process of dual 
policy layering which then proved to be stable despite the changed circumstances in 2013. By 
layering, we mean the ‘introduction of new rules on top of or alongside existing ones’ (Mahoney 
and Thelen 2010, 15) to respond to new policy concerns which cannot be neglected or addressed 
through symbolic policy measures. Although the CAP has changed substantially it has not been 
displaced by a fundamentally new policy and nor have new policy instruments altered its core 
function of supporting farm incomes. A number of scholars (e.g. Garzon, 2006) have argued that 
the series of reforms to 2003 had involved a paradigm shift, from state-assisted to multifunctional. 
Such conclusions are mostly based on analyses of the discourses used by the EU Commission to 
justify the reforms (see Alons and Zwaan, 2015 and Erjavec and Erjavec, 2009 for recent 
examples). Applying an alternative approach in which paradigm change is indicated by the change 
in policy impact, Daugbjerg and Swinbank (2009: 137-8) however concluded that ‘the 
multifunctional paradigm is no more than a newer evolved version of the state-assisted paradigm, or 
indeed the state-assisted paradigm in disguise. … In both … public intervention is seen as essential 
to direct agricultural production towards the desired outcomes.’  
 
Gradual policy layering unfolds through a stepwise single, dual or even multiple, dimensional 
process in which new concerns are added to the policy and subsequently strengthened over time. 
There is now a distinct literature on gradual institutional change (e.g. Rocco and Thurston 2014) in 
which the initial emphasis was on categorising, identifying and verifying gradual change processes 
(e.g. Streeck and Thelen 2005). Recent pioneering research has focused on establishing the 
conditions under which various types of gradual change occur (Mahoney and Thelen 2010) and 
developing indicators in order to measure different types of gradual change (Rocco and Thurston 
2014). Whilst these discussions within the institutionalist literature are important for the theoretical 
development within policy studies, they say little about the durability of policy reform in the post-
enactment phase. Although there has been some research on the durability of single stage policy 
reforms (e.g. Patashnik 2003), there appears to have been none on the conditions influencing the 
durability of gradual policy reforms. This paper focuses on layering, acknowledging that there are 
other types of gradual transformation. Policy layering affects the interest configuration within the 
policy field by influencing actors’ strategies. This has an important impact on whether or not actors 
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remain passive, or mobilise in support of  —or in opposition to—  the changes which, in turn, 
determines the durability of the reform trajectory. 
 
 
Layering and Gradual Policy Reform 
Patashnik (2003) observes that in the post-enactment phase some reforms are maintained while for 
others a reversal may occur soon after adoption. As circumstances change, and they do, as new 
personalities (and egos) take control, and as new policy concerns come to the fore, policy reversals 
are quite possible as ‘There is no guarantee that the politicians of tomorrow will share the 
preferences of today’s leaders’ (Patashnik 2003, 209). Patashnik’s work on the political 
sustainability of policy reforms  —which he defines as ‘the capacity of any public policy [reform] 
to maintain its stability, coherence, and integrity as time passes, achieving its basic promised goals 
amid the inevitable vicissitudes of politics’ (Patashnik 2003, 207)—  has been widely cited, but few 
scholars have engaged with it. Further, Patashnik’s work relates only to single-stage reforms. 
Gradual policy reform processes may well create sustainability dynamics that are quite different. 
 
Policies are sustained by coalitions of actors who form their interests on the basis of the actual 
distribution of policy costs and benefits, or on what they perceive them to be (Pierson 1993, 
Mahoney and Thelen 2010, 7-14). However, policies may become subject to criticism arising 
outside the policy sector, or from actors who populate the periphery of the policy network, because 
of an increasingly negative (real or perceived) impact on the interests that they represent. To 
accommodate concerns raised by such actors, new layers may be added to the policy in an attempt 
to deflect pressure for more substantial changes and thus to ensure that policy can continue 
fulfilling its original purposes, but perhaps in new ways. Layering is a ‘process [of institutional or 
policy change] that preserves much of the core while adding amendments through which rules and 
structures inherited from the past can be brought into synch with changes in the normative, social, 
and political environments’ (Thelen 2003, 228, see also Mahoney and Thelen 2009, 16). In relation 
to policy layering, ‘core’ would be the ideational foundation, or paradigm, underpinning the policy 
while ‘rules’ and ‘structures’ would be the policy instruments applied and their settings. In Hall’s 
(1993) terminology it would be a second order change in which policy instruments and their settings 
are altered, but the underpinning policy paradigm remains the same. The new layers added to the 
policy may set in motion dynamics, which then substantially transform it. As Mahoney and Thelen 
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(2009, 17) suggest: ‘Each new element may be a small change in itself, yet these small changes can 
accumulate, leading to big changes over the long run’. As the reason policy makers engage in layering 
is to preserve the core of policy, paradigm change is unlikely to result unless they lose control over the 
process. However, Streeck and Thelen (2005, 24) suggest that layering may eventually crowd out the 
old policy system. While we agree that layering can lead to substantial transformation over time and 
crowd out the core of the old policy, labelling such a policy trajectory as ‘layering’ would be to stretch 
the concept too far. A more appropriate term for this would be policy conversion, or perhaps layered 
conversion, in which policy is ’redirected to new goals, functions, or purposes’ (Streeck and Thelen 
2005, 26), although unintentionally in this situation.  
 
The key question focussed on in this paper is whether, and if so how, policy layering taking place over 
an extended time can produce policy changes which are durable in the long term and resilient to 
reversal when circumstances change in favour of those who would like to see policy return to a 
previous mode. Patashnik (2003, 211) argues that to prevent reversal, policy change must be 
accompanied by an institutional reform that politically disadvantages the old client groups either by 
destroying existing policy institutions and transferring control to an institution that supports the 
reform, or by giving privileged access to pro-reform coalitions. Furthermore, new policy feedback 
mechanisms must be established. These should be aimed at splitting the coalition of client groups 
favoured by the old policy and at supporting the interests of those groups that benefit from the 
reform. Whilst gradual reform achieved through layering is unlikely to be accompanied by a 
dismantling of the original policy’s institutions, policy feedback effects can play a crucial role, but 
in ways different from those envisaged by Patashnik. They must pacify potential emerging 
opposition to the policy change within (and outside) the target group, and ideally build support for 
the reform within new constituencies. Thus the way in which the new layers affect the interest 
configuration around policy is key to understanding the durability of gradual reforms.  
 
Policy reform may have significant distributional and visibility impacts. Policies impose costs on some 
groups whilst benefitting others. The particular distribution of costs and benefits determine which 
groups will organise and mobilise in support of, or in opposition to, policy. Using the strategy of policy 
layering, policy designers can change the distribution of costs and benefits by adding new policy 
instruments or by redesigning existing ones, and thus change the interest configuration around policy.  
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The visibility effects also influence the way in which actors position themselves in relation to policy. 
As Pierson (1993: 619) points out: ‘The specific design of programs may heighten the visibility of 
some social and political connections while obscuring others. In a context of great social 
complexity, policies may generate “focusing events” or cues that help social actors to interpret the 
world around them. Policy induced cues may influence an individual’s awareness of activity.’ Since 
policy instruments highlight certain aspects of policy and hide others, they influence the way in 
which policy is interpreted by actors and thus define their interest in relation to it. It is important to 
point out that the ‘… visibility … can vary independently of a policy’s actual impact and … this 
variation may be a product of policy design’ (Pierson, 1993: 622). In other words, the signals sent 
by the policy instruments may create perceptions about certain outcomes amongst some 
stakeholders and this may shape interests in a particular way.  
 
Layering adds new policy instruments, or redesigns existing ones, to address new concerns whilst 
pursuing the original objectives. The new layers are designed to be visible  —or to provide 
distributional benefits—  to those actors whose concerns are addressed.  Aspects of policy that 
previously were not visible to a broader group of policy actors may now become discernible and hence 
produce feedback effects which may potentially generate opposition within the target group of the 
reform or within a broader policy constituency. One way to address this challenge is to combine 
layering addressing the primary concern with complementary layering aimed at secondary concerns 
emerging as a side effect of the primary layering process. Successful dual or multiple layering requires 
that policy designers avoid inconsistencies or contradictions between the new layers as this may spill 
over into tensions between policy actors which may result in continuing controversies and conflict 
(see Kay 2007).  
 
Single-stage reforms tend to generate a ‘shock’ as a result of their high visibility. Firstly, the visibility 
effects may challenge established understandings of the role of government policy. For instance, the 
shift from market price support  —which hid the real cost of farm support from both consumers and 
farmers—  to taxpayer funded payments to farmers, made the magnitude of farm support very visible. 
Secondly, single-stage reforms require target group members to adjust to major policy changes that 
may be associated with substantial distributional effects, over a relatively short time period. Target 
group members invest physical and human capital to utilise the opportunities to benefit from public 
policies (Pierson 1993, 598-611). Single-stage reforms change the opportunity structure relatively 
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swiftly with the result that policy induced physical and human capital investments may be lost or 
become difficult to retrieve. Moreover, single-stage reforms leave few opportunities for policy makers 
to address unintended consequences, as the speed with which the changes are undertaken does not 
allow for a trial-and-error process.  
 
Policy takers’ responses to the policy changes are critical in relation to reform durability. The feedback 
effects of a single stage reform, as discussed above, can generate substantial opposition amongst policy 
takers. Time may work in favour of dissatisfied policy takers giving them opportunities to reverse the 
reform.  After reform has been adopted the attention of policy makers, the media, and the general 
public, is likely to shift elsewhere; and watchdog groups (e.g. consumer and environmental groups) 
may lack incentives and the organisational capacity to monitor policy developments in the post-
enactment phase (Patashnik 2003, 211).  Gradual policy layering minimises negative feedbacks and 
thus limits the level of opposition generated within the reform sequence. The longer time perspective 
allows policy takers to write-down investments in physical and human capital, and to adjust behaviour 
to benefit from the new resources and incentives brought about by the reformed policy. Furthermore, it 
allows time for administrative practices to adjust to limit and address unintended consequences. 
 
To substantiate the argument that gradual policy layering can potentially produce policy reform which 
is politically sustainable in the post-enactment phase, we analyse the sequence of CAP reforms from 
1984 to 2013. The analysis consists of three components in which: 
 We demonstrate the existence of a dual gradual layering sequence aimed at addressing new 
policy concerns, whilst retaining the core objective of farm income support. 
 Show that the two layers are complementary and consistent when addressing new and old 
policy concerns. 
 Suggest a causal relation between policy layering and reform sustainability. As this cannot 
be established directly we identify indirect indicators consistent with a causal relationship. 
These are: 
o Limited policy reversal of the CAP in the 2013 reform despite favourable conditions 
for backtracking 
o Limited farm group opposition in the post-enactment phase of each reform adopted 
from 1992 to 2008. 
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The CAP reform path 1984 – 2008: gradual reform and policy layering  
In 1983, rapidly rising spending on the dairy regime as a result of increasing surplus production helped 
trigger a severe budget crisis (Avery, 1984). The dairy quota reform of 1984 was part of a broader 
settlement on the budget. Had nothing been done, a collapse of the CAP threatened. By the mid-
1980s overproduction in the cereals sector had become increasingly problematic; and the surplus was 
subsidised for sale on world markets creating tensions with the EU’s trade partners. Matters came to a 
head in 1988 with another ‘reform’ of the CAP introducing a system of agricultural budget stabilisers 
and a voluntary, but compensated, set-aside scheme (i.e. land in set-aside could not be used for crops or 
grazing). Unfortunately the new mechanisms proved less robust than had been hoped (Manegold, 
1989). They did, however, provide the excuse for the new reform initiative that the Commission 
launched in 1991 (the MacSharry reform).  
 
 
Introducing greening and trade concerns into the CAP 
Budgetary pressure was the driving force of the CAP reforms of the 1980s, whilst also encouraging 
environmental layering. Although many farmers were keen to support the biodiversity and 
environmental attributes of their farms, collectively they had been reluctant to accept the 
environmentalists’ critique of agricultural policies and modern farming practices. The Commission’s 
1985 Perspectives for the Common Agricultural Policy for example, acknowledged that intensive 
farming caused environmental damage and pollution. It went on to argue that, as well as ‘“passive” 
protection of the environment’, there needed to be ‘a policy designed to promote farming practices 
which conserve the rural environment and protect specific sites’. These were public goods which 
farmers should be paid to deliver (Commission of the European Communities, 1985: 50-2). EU 
legislation was amended allowing Member States to introduce incentive schemes to encourage 
environmental enhancement. In 1990, stating that ‘environmental considerations must be gradually 
integrated into the common agricultural policy and European agricultural practices’, the Commission 
proposed ‘the introduction of an aid scheme to encourage substantial reductions in the use of 
fertilizers’ to help in the ‘reduction in pollution through farming’, but also to reduce production 
through extensification (Commission of the European Communities, 1990: 11). This eventually 
became the agri-environmental regulation agreed as one of the Accompanying Measures in the 1992 
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reform (Lowe & Whitby, 1997: 294-5). The 1990 proposal also sought to amend the voluntary set-
aside scheme, introduced in 1988, ‘to make it more compatible with environmental requirements’.  
 
Agriculture was an integral part of the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations that led to the 
formation of the WTO in 1995. The EU’s reluctance to change the CAP produced stalemate in 
December 1990. It was only after the then farm Commissioner, Ray MacSharry succeeded in 
reforming the CAP in May 1992 that the Uruguay Round could be concluded. The reform 
embedded an additional layer into the CAP in that international trade policy concerns were 
increasingly taken into account. The subsequent reform trajectory from the 1990s to 2008 was one 
of increasing WTO compatibility, as well as greening.  
 
The MacSharry reform changed the design of the CAP’s farm support instruments, but not its 
specific objective of supporting farm incomes. Nor was a redistribution of policy benefits intended. 
Part of the costs were, however, switched from consumers to taxpayers. The main change came in 
the cereals sector in which guaranteed prices were reduced by a third, whilst farmers were 
compensated for the implied revenue loss by the introduction of a subsidy paid on each hectare of 
eligible land on which certain crops were grown, or on the number of livestock kept. For larger 
farmers, area payments were contingent on 15% of their arable land being set-aside.  
 
This partial shift from price support to direct payments increased the visibility of agricultural 
subsidies. As Kjeldahl (1994) pointed out: ‘The switch to direct payments is making financial 
support to farmers more visible. Not only will it be increasingly clear to farmers how much support 
they each receive, but also the total payments in each Member State can easily be seen’. Indeed 
COPA (1991: 3), the European Association of Farmers’ Unions, feared that the visibility of direct 
payments would decrease public support for the CAP, declaring: ‘it is not certain that Community 
taxpayers will agree to shoulder the financial burden on a permanent and continuous basis’. This 
was a clear indication that direct payments had to be legitimised. The Commission had already 
recognised this in its Reflections Paper, which had introduced the reform plan, in saying that policy 
makers needed to recognise that ‘the farmer fulfils, or at least could and should fulfil, two functions 
viz firstly that of producing and secondly of protecting the environment in the context of rural 
development’ (Commission of the European Communities, 1991: 10).  
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The Commission had expressed concerns about the adverse environmental effects of price support 
through its encouragement of the intensification of production (Commission of the European 
Communities, 1991: 2). The headline-grabbing changes to the CAP were in themselves expected to 
bring environmental benefits: lower prices would provide incentive to apply less fertilizers and 
agrochemicals, and set-aside might be managed in an environmentally sensitive manner. But in 
addition the reform introduced three so-called Accompanying Measures, including an agri-
environment regulation that placed an obligation on Member States to introduce a suite of measures 
for the protection of the environment and the maintenance of the countryside. Prior to 1992 
environmentalists had criticised the CAP from the outside (Potter, 1998: 43-51). Now they were 
more explicitly brought in to decision-making circles as the rules on mandatory set-aside and agri-
environmental schemes were developed. However, while the reform had increased the influence of 
environmental interests, this was offset by the declining influence of another outsider group – 
consumers – as farm support instruments were redesigned. Consumer groups were active critics of 
the pre-1992 CAP (see e.g. the UK’s National Consumer Council, 1988). The 1992 reform, and 
subsequent developments, meant that by the late 2000s it could no longer be convincingly argued that 
the CAP increased food prices across the board, disadvantaging consumers. Consequently, consumer 
groups have to a considerable extent disengaged themselves from farm policy making, but not from 
food safety policy. 
 
 
Increased intersection of greening and international trade concerns 
In 1995 Franz Fischler became Commissioner for Agriculture and Rural Development. Although 
never officially endorsed by the EU’s farm ministers, it is widely believed that the Cork 
Declaration’s ten-point rural development programme that emerged from a major conference in 
1996 reflected Fischler’s view of how policy for rural areas should develop (Lowe, Buller & Ward, 
2002: 2-3). 
 
Despite the Cork Declaration’s focus on rural development, by 1998 the Commission was more 
preoccupied with defending the concept of multifunctionality and advancing the thesis that there 
was a European Model of Agriculture: a stance supported by COPA (Volanen, 2000). In its 
proposal for the Agenda 2000 reform, for example, the Commission declared ‘The fundamental 
difference between the European model and that of our major competitors lies in the multifunctional 
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nature of Europe’s agriculture and the part it plays in the economy and the environment, in society 
and in preserving the landscape, whence the need to maintain farming throughout Europe and to 
safeguard farmers’ incomes’ (Commission of the European Communities, 1998: 8). This was in line 
with the EU’s preparations for the WTO Ministerial Meeting scheduled for Seattle in late 1999, at 
which the EU was keen to defend its existing system of farm support (Daugbjerg & Swinbank, 
2009: 158-9). 
 
Agenda 2000 was a wide-ranging package that included a new Financial Framework for the period 
2000-06, and a remodelling of the structural funds, as well as a CAP reform. Regarding the CAP’s 
market price policy a second dose of MacSharry’s formula of price cuts and compensation 
payments was applied. Member States were now allowed to introduce cross-compliance —making 
the full entitlement to area payments contingent on compliance with a number of environmental 
conditions— but very few took up this option (Fischler, 2001). Nevertheless, the Agenda 2000 
reform had taken the first step towards linking direct payments to environmental requirements as a 
way to legitimise agricultural support. 
 
The main innovation was the creation of the so-called Second Pillar of the CAP, with a new Rural 
Development regulation. This had three themes: restructuring of European agriculture and 
improving its competiveness (embracing schemes covered by the CAP’s old structural policy); agri-
environmental schemes (the Accompanying Measures of the MacSharry reform) and subsidies paid 
to farmers in the Less Favoured Areas; and a new strategy of developing the rural economy, 
amounting to a mere 10% of Pillar 2 expenditure (European Commission, 2003: 5). Whilst funding 
for this third theme was very limited, the signalling effect that the CAP was more than just farm 
support was considerable. 
 
Fischler had a second stab at CAP reform in 2003, during an important phase of the Doha Round 
that had begun in 2001. The US and the Australian-led Cairns Group wanted the blue box domestic 
support category (which sheltered the EU’s area and headage payments that the MacSharry reform 
had introduced) abolished, and payments under this category included in the amber box reduction 
commitments (Daugbjerg & Swinbank 2009, 165).3 Within the EU these direct payments were no 
                                                          
3
 The WTO Agreement on Agriculture distinguishes between support that is subject to constraints (amber box), 
partially decoupled support that is not currently subject to financial limits (blue box), and support measures that have 
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longer seen as compensation payments; instead they had become an integral part of CAP income 
support (Commission of the European Communities, 2002a: 4-6). A key feature of the 2003 reform 
was a further decoupling of these area and headage payments: the basic idea was that recipients 
could continue to receive them (under the Single Payment Scheme: SPS) provided they retained 
control of agricultural land, but there was a further element of decoupling in that farmers no longer 
had to plant crops or keep animals. The purpose of the reform was to accommodate pressure from 
international and domestic trade interests, but maintain unchanged the core of the CAP as a farm 
income support policy. Considerable care was taken to avoid a redistribution of support in the basic 
scheme (Haniotis 2007, 58). This was emphasised by the Commission which argued that the reform 
was designed to take ‘into account the need to preserve farming incomes in a less trade distorting 
way’. This would be ‘a major advantage within the WTO, since the … compatibility of the scheme 
will help secure these payments in an international context’ (Commission of the European 
Communities, 2002b: 3, 19).   
 
Member States were however given considerable discretion in implementing the SPS: rather than 
full decoupling they could opt to decouple only 75% of the old arable area payment, for example, 
whilst linking the remaining 25% to a continuation of arable cropping. In addition to responding to 
the WTO agenda, the reform was a further step along the greening path, as SPS payments were 
subject to cross compliance: requiring farmers to comply with a series of environmental, animal 
health and welfare, and food safety regulations, and to keep their land in a good agricultural and 
environmental condition. 
 
As the 2003 reform had resulted in a further decoupling of direct payments (the basic scheme 
simply insisted that farmers kept their agricultural land) this had increased the need to legitimise the 
payments. Compulsory cross-compliance was the obvious solution. As the Council (2003: 2-3) 
bluntly stated: 
The full payment of direct aid should be linked to compliance with rules relating to 
agricultural land, agricultural production and activity. Those rules should serve to incorporate 
in the common market organisations basic standards for the environment, food safety, animal 
health and welfare and good agricultural and environmental condition. If those basic standards 
are not met, Member States should withdraw direct aid in whole or in part ….  
                                                                                                                                                                                                
‘no, or at most minimal, trade-distorting effects or effects on production’ (green box). 
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The 2008 Health Check did away with set-aside, and many of the partial decoupling options from 
the 2003 package were removed. Thus by 2012 the bulk of CAP support took the form of decoupled 
payments. Though the Health Check was not officially legitimised by developments in the WTO, it 
created some extra leeway for the EU in the Doha Round negotiations (Daugbjerg & Swinbank 2011). 
 
Although farm groups frequently lobbied against the proposed reforms (see for example Garzon, 
2006: 70, 89, 111), farmers quickly adapted to new circumstances, and recognised the inevitability 
of further reform. There had been a mixed response to the 1992 reform. For instance, Germany’s 
farm union had claimed it was ‘disastrous’ and in France the farm union, FNSEA, considered it an 
economic and political error. Belgian and Italian farm unions were also opposed. But British, 
Danish, Dutch, Irish, Greek and Spanish farm unions were largely content (Agra Europe 1992). In 
practice the direct payments introduced by this reform ‘proved much more popular than anticipated 
in the farm community’ (Moyer and Josling 2002: 194) because they increased farmers’ income 
security and safeguarded against severe income losses caused by bad harvests. Farmers in Germany, 
Portugal and the UK, in a survey undertaken in the autumn and winter of 2001/2002 before the 
Fischler reform was proposed, were broadly of the view that the Agenda 2000 system of direct 
payments formed ‘a reliable source of income for farmers’ and that, if withdrawn, ‘many farms 
would become unprofitable’. Nonetheless, they felt that the ‘current arrangements’ did not work 
well and that, due to pressures for change, the system ‘will need to be reformed’ (Tranter, Costa, 
Knapp, Little and Sottomayor, 2004: 131). In the 2003 reform process farm group ‘opposition to the 
reform appeared milder than in previous years’ (Garzon, 2006: 111). After adoption of the reform, a 
pattern of reactions similar to 1992 emerged. French and German farm groups remained opposed to 
the changes while their governments were content that they had achieved a good deal for their 
farmers. Positive reactions were expressed by the British, Italian and Swedish farm unions (Agra 
Focus 2003a, 2003b).  
  
The series of CAP reforms from 1992 to 2008 had gradually transformed the lion’s share of CAP 
support from price support to decoupled payments. As direct payments became more decoupled, the 
more important it became to legitimise them. Therefore the two layering processes became 
increasingly linked. Increased linkage of environmental requirements to farm support produced a 
visible greening of policy which legitimised decoupled payments to EU citizens and Member States 
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with preferences for a greener CAP, and at the same time maintained the original objective of 
supporting farm incomes. The greening and WTO layers worked in parallel to produce political 
reform sustainability, by partially replacing existing policy instruments by new ones that maintained 
income support as the core of the policy whilst increasingly responding to pressing trade and 
environmental concerns. Farmers accepted these reforms and adapted to them. While the 
distributional effects continued to benefit farmers, the visibility effects concentrated on sending the 
message that farm support was provided in return for environmental benefits.  
 
 
The 2013 ‘reform’ 
On world markets the price of agricultural commodities had spiked in 2007 and 2008, and then in 
2009 a collapse in dairy product prices led to a ‘dairy crisis’ in the EU triggering temporary 
intervention buying of butter and skim milk powder, and the reintroduction of export subsidies 
(Agra Europe, 2009). For CAP traditionalists these events simply demonstrated the dangers 
inherent in ‘free’ markets, and reinforced their view that a ‘strong’ CAP was still required. It was 
against this backdrop that the new Commissioner, Dacian Cioloş, launched a public consultation on 
the future of the CAP from which it emerged that ‘the overwhelming majority of views expressed 
concurred that the future CAP should remain a strong common policy structured around its two 
pillars’ (European Commission, 2010a: 2). In the summer of 2008 the Doha Round had come 
tantalisingly close to completion, with an agreement on agriculture virtually agreed (Daugbjerg & 
Swinbank, 2009: 171). International trade negotiations had been a powerful driver of CAP reform 
from 1992 to 2008; but that pressure had now abated. Even if the Doha Round were to be concluded 
on the basis of the 2008 blueprint, it was now the EU’s view that the CAP could fit within any new 
WTO constraints without difficulty (Demarty 2009). The new powers of the EP’s agricultural 
committee, COMAGRI, strengthened farm interests in the early 2010s. Under these circumstances, 
that strengthened the resolve of those who wanted to reverse the CAP back to a more traditional 
mode, including Member States such as France, Spain, Italy and Poland (all powerful players in 
agricultural policy making), it is puzzling why the past CAP reform trajectory appeared to be so 
politically durable. 
 
The Commission’s first communication on the planned 2013 reform reflected the diminished impact 
of WTO concerns. The WTO was only mentioned twice, although the Commission also 
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reconfirmed its intention of ‘respecting EU commitments in international trade’ (European 
Commission 2010a, 4). The main objectives were to further ‘green’ the CAP by adding new 
environmental requirements, and to bring about a more equitable distribution of agricultural support 
within regions and amongst member states (European Commission 2010a, 3).  
 
The Commission’s proposal for the post-2013 CAP was to roll forward the CAP budget in nominal 
terms (although declining in real terms) with its existing split between Pillar 1 (income support) and 
Pillar 2. There would be some redistribution of direct payments: towards regionalised flat-rate 
regimes within Member States, and a marginal shift in the budget allocation towards Member States 
with relatively low payments. The most striking feature was that 30% of the budget for direct 
payments would be tied to a greening component, to ‘ensure that all farms deliver environmental 
and climate benefits through the retention of soil carbon and grassland habitats associated with 
permanent pasture, the delivery of water and habitat protection by the establishment of ecological 
focus areas and improvement of the resilience of soil and ecosystems through crop diversification’ 
(European Commission, 2011: 3). Farmers would have to establish Ecological Focus Areas, 
diversify their cropping, and maintain permanent grassland.  
 
The increased greening of direct payments was designed to send a message to the public that the CAP 
was there to support the production of public goods, and thus to legitimise the continuation of farm 
support. In the public consultations stakeholder organisations, in particular environmental groups, and 
the public had expressed strong support for more environmental measures (European Commission 
2010b). Harnessing this support, rather than bringing about significant environmental improvements, 
was most likely the actual purpose of the greening measures proposed. Analysts such as Tangermann 
(2012: 324) suggested that ‘phoney’ excuses underpinned the reform proposal: ‘“greening” the 
payments may potentially serve the political purpose of suggesting they have a reasonable justification. 
Yet on closer inspection, the direct payments cannot really be considered to be justified on the grounds 
of objectives related to the environment and climate change’. This suggests the state-assisted paradigm, 
rather than a deep-routed endorsement of multifunctionality, continues to characterise the CAP. The 
fact that environmental groups distanced themselves from the greening measures when tabled in 
October 2011 (Agra Facts, 2011) is yet another indication of this. 
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Given the overall budget pressures the EU faced, ‘avoiding a sharp reduction in the level of the 
[CAP] budget was, for many, contingent upon genuine greening measures’, but the Commission 
failed to explain ‘how these measures might work in practice or what their impact was likely to be 
environmentally’ (Knops and Swinnen 2014: 84). Once the CAP budget had been agreed for the 
2014-20 Financial Framework, many observers believe that the farm lobby was then able to water-
down the already weak proposals, leaving the rhetoric of greening, but little substance (Pe’er et al., 
2014). As a result, the status quo was maintained despite the apparent greening trajectory. But a 
senior official in the Commission’s agricultural Directorate-General (DG) remained concerned that 
a failure to demonstrate that greening was working ‘would weaken the justification for the hefty 
€55 billion yearly CAP budget [and] lead other Commission DGs to push for cuts’ (Agra Facts, 
2015). 
 
Recoupling of direct payments was not initially part of the Commission’s agenda, although existing 
levels of coupled support for ‘specific sectors and regions’ could continue (European Commission, 
2010a: 14). Superficially too the EP’s stance was that ‘decoupling has essentially proved its worth, 
allowing greater autonomy in decision-making on the part of farmers, ensuring that farmers respond 
to market signals and placing the vast bulk of the CAP in the WTO green box.’ Nonetheless the 
next paragraph called on: 
… Member States to have the option of allowing part of the direct payments to remain wholly 
or partially coupled within WTO limits in order to finance measures to mitigate the impact of 
decoupling in specific areas and sectors that are economically, environmentally and socially 
sensitive … (European Parliament, 2011).  
 
The stalemate in the Doha Round negotiations meant that the Uruguay Round’s Agreement on 
Agriculture still applied. This could potentially have allowed a reversal of the CAP back to its 1992 
version, with partially coupled area and livestock payments, unravelling the decoupling of the 2003 
and 2008 reforms. However, despite the push for recoupling, policy reversal in the 2013 ‘reform’ 
was very limited.  
 
When the Commission launched its formal proposal it envisaged allowing Member States the 
option to apply voluntary coupled support for up to 5% of their direct payments, or to 10% if the 
pre-existing level of coupled support exceeded 5% (European Commission 2011, 18). In the 
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subsequent debate there was strong support for more recoupling. The EP voted in March 2013 for 
15% in all Member States (Agra Facts, 2013). In the bargaining that took place between the 
Commission, the Council of Ministers and the Parliament, a group of 13 Member States including 
France, Spain, Italy and Poland intervened, strongly supporting Parliament’s proposal (Embassy of 
France in Washington, 2013). The compromise settled upon was for 8% and 13%, plus a further 
two percentage points for protein crops (European Parliament and Council, 2013: 615). These 
percentages are higher than what was in place pre-2013, or had been proposed by the Commission; 
but it was far from a backtracking to the 25% allowed in the 2003 reform. With significant 
variations between Member States, initial indications are that 10% of the direct aid budget will be 
coupled (European Commission, 2015: slide 19). 
 
Despite the weakening of WTO constraints, and the further empowering of farm over trade 
interests, the policy reversal of recoupling farm support was limited. Moreover, greening in the 
2013 ‘reform’ turned out to be stronger on rhetoric than substance, although it did introduce new 
policy instruments with which farmers (many reluctantly) will have to comply. Despite these new 
instruments, the post-2013 CAP is neither a reversion to an old style CAP, nor a new style 
environmental policy. Instead, it strongly resembles the pre-2013 CAP, with its dominant focus on 
farm interests. The gradual reform trajectory that had taken place from the early 1990s to 2008 had 
proved politically sustainable.   
 
 
Conclusions 
Gradual policy reform may be more attractive to policy makers than radical single-stage reform, 
and it may be more durable in the post-enactment phase. Gradual policy reform does not involve a 
frontal assault on well-established policy institutions, or on entrenched interest groups representing 
the beneficiaries of the existing policy. Gradual reform enables policy change through a layering 
process in which new concerns are added to the existing policy and strengthened over time. Policy 
designers can utilise the distributive and visibility effects of introducing new policy instruments or 
changing existing ones to affect the interest configuration around policy to maintain support and 
neutralise opposition. This may produce a durable reform trajectory.  
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Our analysis of the CAP reform sequence from the mid-1980s until 2013 demonstrates that gradual 
reform through a dual layering process may produce politically sustainable policy reform. This 
sequence of reforms emerged more by accident than design —there is nothing that suggests policy-
makers were implementing from the outset a long-term strategic plan. The international trade and 
greening concerns were gradually added to the policy through a twin layering process and were 
consistent with the original objective of supporting farm incomes, but now in much less trade 
distorting ways. Furthermore the two new layers were consistent with each other, and one even 
reinforced the other. In addition to addressing environmental concerns, greening also served the 
purpose of legitimising the CAP to the public, and even to farmers themselves, for farm support 
could now be seen as compensation for the costs of complying with environmental policy measures, 
particularly when compared to the lighter burden perceived to be borne by European farmers’ 
international competitors. Though initially opposed to direct payments, farm groups eventually 
became less critical as they became more familiar with them, and as payments were increasingly 
portrayed as remuneration for the provision of public goods. When, in the lead up to the 2013 
reform, political and institutional circumstances changed in favour of conservative forces desiring a 
return to previous policy modes, the reform path proved resilient and only limited reversal took 
place. 
 
Patashnik (2003) set an important research agenda by asking what happens to policy reform in the 
post-enactment phase, and under what conditions are reforms durable? So far, few studies have 
engaged with this agenda. In this paper, we have moved beyond Patashnik’s focus on single-stage 
reform and explored the durability of gradual reform implemented through a layering process over 
three decades. However, layering per se is not the prescription for durable policy reform. We have 
suggested some conditions under which such a reform strategy is politically sustainable in the 
longer term, but comparative research is needed to further test our arguments and explore other 
conditions for politically sustainable gradual reform.  
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